Central Bank Bond Purchases and US Interest Rates
Do bond purchases by the People’s Bank of China (or the Bank of Japan or SAMA or [fill in the blank]) lower US interest rates? Clearly “no” is not quite an acceptable answer, but the answer is not quite as much of a “yes” as many people think.
In the short run the Fed has a target for the short-term interest rate. If the PBoC buys Treasury bills, the Fed will sell enough Treasury bills to keep the interest rate essentially unchanged.
What about the long-term interest rate? Certainly it’s true that, if the PBoC makes, out of the blue, a decision to buy long-term bonds instead of bills, those purchases will tend to push down the long-term interest rate. But why would the PBoC make such a decision? Presumably for the same reason that a domestic bondholder might typically make such a decision: the difference between the long-term rate and expected short-term rates over the life of the long-term bond is big enough (and in the right direction) to compensate for the risk of holding a longer maturity asset. Is there any reason to think that the PBoC has different maturity preferences than a typical domestic US investor? If anything, the PBoC takes more risk than a domestic investor by extending maturities. If long-term rates are high enough to be attractive to the PBoC, they should be, if anything, even more attractive to a domestic investor, which means, if the PBoC weren’t there to buy, domestic investors would have provided the same demand, and the interest rate would be the same.
Of course, Chinese demand will affect the long-term interest rate if it affects the expected path of short-term interest rates. And it probably does, but the influence is not entirely straightforward. China’s bond purchases are a side effect of China’s dollar purchases, and the dollar purchases have the intended effect of strengthening the dollar. The strong dollar makes US exports less attractive and imports more attractive, which reduces the level of aggregate demand in the US economy, and, as a result, the Fed is ultimately likely to follow a looser monetary policy, so interest rates do go down.
So intervention by China (or Japan or Saudi Arabia or wherever) does have the net effect of reducing US interest rates. At any particular time, though, the effect of such intervention is likely to be swamped by the effects of other business cycle phenomena. For example, dollar purchases (and the attendant bond purchases) by foreign central banks increased dramatically between 2002 and 2005, but so did US interest rates. In 2002, the US was experiencing the effects of the tech bust; in 2005 the US was experiencing the effects of the housing boom. Intervention was a factor – probably pushing interest rates farther down in 2002 and keeping them from rising quite as high in 2005 (and 2006) – but it wasn’t the main part of the story. In general, if you want to find out what’s going to happen to US interest rates, foreign central bank intervention is not the thing to look at.
In the short run the Fed has a target for the short-term interest rate. If the PBoC buys Treasury bills, the Fed will sell enough Treasury bills to keep the interest rate essentially unchanged.
What about the long-term interest rate? Certainly it’s true that, if the PBoC makes, out of the blue, a decision to buy long-term bonds instead of bills, those purchases will tend to push down the long-term interest rate. But why would the PBoC make such a decision? Presumably for the same reason that a domestic bondholder might typically make such a decision: the difference between the long-term rate and expected short-term rates over the life of the long-term bond is big enough (and in the right direction) to compensate for the risk of holding a longer maturity asset. Is there any reason to think that the PBoC has different maturity preferences than a typical domestic US investor? If anything, the PBoC takes more risk than a domestic investor by extending maturities. If long-term rates are high enough to be attractive to the PBoC, they should be, if anything, even more attractive to a domestic investor, which means, if the PBoC weren’t there to buy, domestic investors would have provided the same demand, and the interest rate would be the same.
Of course, Chinese demand will affect the long-term interest rate if it affects the expected path of short-term interest rates. And it probably does, but the influence is not entirely straightforward. China’s bond purchases are a side effect of China’s dollar purchases, and the dollar purchases have the intended effect of strengthening the dollar. The strong dollar makes US exports less attractive and imports more attractive, which reduces the level of aggregate demand in the US economy, and, as a result, the Fed is ultimately likely to follow a looser monetary policy, so interest rates do go down.
So intervention by China (or Japan or Saudi Arabia or wherever) does have the net effect of reducing US interest rates. At any particular time, though, the effect of such intervention is likely to be swamped by the effects of other business cycle phenomena. For example, dollar purchases (and the attendant bond purchases) by foreign central banks increased dramatically between 2002 and 2005, but so did US interest rates. In 2002, the US was experiencing the effects of the tech bust; in 2005 the US was experiencing the effects of the housing boom. Intervention was a factor – probably pushing interest rates farther down in 2002 and keeping them from rising quite as high in 2005 (and 2006) – but it wasn’t the main part of the story. In general, if you want to find out what’s going to happen to US interest rates, foreign central bank intervention is not the thing to look at.
Labels: economics, exchange rates, interest rates, macroeconomics
12 Comments:
Try this on for size: the chinese want US long interest rates low as a way to boost US consumption, increasing investment in their infrastructure, often paid for by foreign companies using cheap money to build factories.
Chinese, as a people, are highly intelligent and think for the long term. It's US consumption that is transforming their country, and they want that to continue.
There may be a price to pay down the road in terms of massive financial adjustment, but what they are getting right now is a massive infrastructure building, often courtesty of foreign investment.
What's to stop them from using US consumer appetite to induce foreign companies to spend capital to build things (financed with cheap long term rates), and then nationalize the infrastructure once the trough runs dry?
Perhaps they are not this shrewd, but I think it's dangerous to think of central banks the same as private investors. When you can rewrite the property laws, things look a whole lot different incentive wise.
I agree that central banks don’t necessarily behave like private investors, but I don’t buy either of the two motivations you suggest that the PBoC might have for buying long-term bonds. There is no reason to expect long-term interest rates to have a disproportionate effect on consumer demand (as opposed to, for example, business demand). I very much doubt that the PBoC anticipated the US housing boom, and if this were their motivation, we would expect them right now to be increasing their preference for long-term bonds (to prevent the housing boom from going bust) rather than (as they are apparently doing) decreasing it. And China already has more investment than they want, so buying long-term bonds to encourage foreign investment wouldn’t make sense.
Very interesting analysis, knzn.
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lower U.S. interest rates relative to what? is the measuring rod an elaborate, counterfactual fantasy of general equilibrium? or something else?
As you say, PBoC is buying U.S. paper as part of an policy of managing the exchange rate AND the relative price levels of the two countries. The profitability of investment in manufacturing almost anything in China is enhanced by a systematic reduction in currency risk and a systematic undervaluation of all factors(-of-production) Chinese.
Comparison of expected returns from investment in manufacturing is going to systematically favor investment in China for export. Investments with tiny expected net present value will be taken up, because of the reduction in risk and the advantage accorded a systematic undervaluation of Chinese production factors (e.g. low unit labor cost).
An elaborate scheme of capital controls limiting the import or export of capital, and offsetting sterilization bonds in the Chinese domestic banking system, give this policy its hydraulic force, channelling all of the pressures into encouraging investment in manufacturing for export, and away from domestic Chinese inflation or a precipitous fall in the dollar.
It is not interest rates, per se, which are affected, but the profitability of opportunities for productive investment. In this regard, China very much wants to affect expectations along a five year or ten year horizon.
The PBoC is engaged in risk attenuation over a five or ten year horizon. That goal is what guides their policy.
Eventually, the yuan will rise relative to the dollar. More importantly, the domestic Chinese economy's price level will also rise. The impact on China's export competitiveness will be offset by increasing productivity and reductions in cost brought about by improved infrastructure. The development of Chinese multinational distribution networks (Haier, Lenovo) will allow the Chinese to capture much larger margins on their manufactured goods sold internationally; international Chinese oil companies and other extraction operations will have a similar effect on the commodity import side. And, a rising Chinese currency will reduce commodity costs (e.g. oil) and the costs of manufactured imports.
China is busy with what may very well be a virtuous spiral, while the U.S. is going down the drain in a vicious spiral, which mirrors the Chinese effort.
Interest rates matter, but it is simple-minded and wrong to imagine that investment is constrained on the supply of money side. There's always plenty of money looking for profitable opportunities. Financial institutions exist to engage in an often losing effort to avoid "investing" too much of that money in "opportunities" with a negative return. What central banks do is manage the value of currencies over time, attenuating risk, so that money can be applied to those profitable opportunities.
An ideal central bank policy is going to keep the yield curve sloping nicely upward, so that financial institutions can borrow short and lend long in a nice orderly way, ensuring that all positive net present value opportunities are financed (and as few negative value black holes appear.)
China would like the U.S. yield curve to slope nicely, just as it would like the Chinese yield curve to slope nicely. Chinese policy is aimed at maximizing the taking up of positive net present value projects in China, particularly in Chinese manufacturing for export. China's policy in that regard will be undermined, should an expectation develop too soon that the U.S. dollar will plunge relative to the Chinese currency.
If central banks are doing their jobs properly, real interest rates are always bumping up against some floor of risk, which can not be diversified away, cannot be finally attenuated. But, interest rates are never really drawing money into the capital markets. That's a misleading way to think. What drives money into capital markets is a low, steady inflation rate, and a little bit of inflation will usually be enough to drive plenty of money into the capital markets.
"Chinese demand will affect the long-term interest rate if it affects the expected path of short-term interest rates."
Not really. The expectations theory of int rates indicates how short rates can affect long rates. But long rates can move independently of short rates, cant they? The so-called Wicksell rate is determined by structural features like potential growth, gov exp, inv demand etc. Itd also be determined by capital inflows from abroad, I guess. (Put simply, if I dump a trillion dollars to the bond mkt tonight, wont int rates fall, independent of short rates).
As others have pointed out, the chinese arent interested in profit or returns; its exports, stupid.
Also, we dont know what theyre buying since theyre also purchasing bonds via private investors, whom they deposit with. So, I dont think you can claim theyve lost preference for US. Right?
"There is no reason to expect long-term interest rates to have a disproportionate effect on consumer demand"
Get nominal (I mean, real). What about mortgages, durables, etc.
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